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POLICY CHALLENGE
Effective financial supervision is essential but no early-warning system
will prevent future crises. EU countries must therefore create enforceable
mechanisms for resolving insolvent European cross-border SIFIs. A second
priority is to ensure that the ESRB has the instruments it will need to miti-
gate systemic risks and vulnerabilities. Third, the European Central Bank
will be at the heart of the ESRB, and the independence of euro-area mone-
tary policy must be
ensured, while the
ECB’s financial stability
toolbox should be
strenghtened. Finally,
the Commission’s
financial supervision
blueprint must be
aggressively imple-
mented, so systemic
risks are spotted early.
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* The views expressed in this Policy Brief
are personal. The author is grateful to
Ignazio Angeloni, Andrew Fielding,
Stephen Gardner, Jean Pisani-Ferry and
Nicolas Véron for their value-added
comments on an earlier draft.
SUMMARYThe European Union is establishing a framework for safeguarding
financial stability, including a new macroprudential supervisor, the
European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB), and strengthened microprudential
supervision through a European System of Financial Supervision (ESFS).
This is a bold step towards a more effective early-warning system for imbal-
ances such as a credit bubble. But the ESRB will lack binding powers, and
the proposed microprudential framework may also lack impact. Early-
warning systems will continue to be unreliable. Europe needs a legislative
framework to resolve the insolvency of systemically important financial
institutions (SIFIs). Other structural vulnerabilities revealed by the crisis
also remain to be addressed.b
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MORE THAN ONE STEP TO FINANCIAL STABILITY
Source: Adapted from tables in Schinasi (2007), ‘Remarks on causes and conditions for cross-bor-
der threats to financial stability’, chapter in FRB Chicago Conference Volume.
1. These proposals are
the outcome of the
work of a high-level
group appointed by
President Barroso in
the autumn 2008 led
by Jacques de
Larosière. See de
Larosière (2009).
2. Paragraph 19 of the
Pittsburgh
communiqué.
Table 1: Pre-crisis oversight framework
Lines of defense
Sources of global systemic financial risk
Global financial
institutions
Global money and
OTC derivatives
markets
Unregulated
activities
Market discipline Partial Primarily Exclusively
Financial
regulation
National with
cooperation
Not really;
over-the-counter
transactions
No
Prudential
supervision
National and
home/host issues N/A No
Market
surveillance
Indirect as
participant
Direct; national and
international
Indirect as
participant
EUROPEAN UNION FINANCIAL-
SYSTEM REFORM EFFORTS now
under way are designed to
address the systemic weaknesses
revealed by the global crisis
1. They
do so by establishing a framework
for safeguarding European fin-
ancial stability. The proposed
reforms also represent part of
Europe’s contribution to G20 coop-
eration at the head-of-state level, a
new, more inclusive process initi-
ated at the Washington summit
(November 2008) and continued
at the London (April 2009) and
Pittsburgh (September 2009)
summits. This higher-level global
governance – which replaces the
G8 as the premier forum for
international economic coopera-
tion
2– came to fruition in no small
part through the efforts in October
2008 of French President Nicolas
Sarkozy (who was then also
President of the European Council)
and European Commission
President José Manuel Barroso. 
Why are these reform efforts nec-
essary – is there not already a
framework in place to deal with
financial difficulties? A key lesson
of the global crisis is that the
supervisory and regulatory frame-
work in place prior to the crisis
failed to detect, to accurately cali-
brate, and to prevent the global
systemic crisis. The pre-crisis
framework comprised a series of
lines of defence (shown by the
rows in Table 1) against sources of
systemic risk (columns, Table 1).
The framework was designed and
evolved over time as financial sys-
tems evolved. It is now evident
that this framework failed to keep
pace with modern global finance.
All lines of defence failed to pre-
vent and adequately address the
kind of imbalances that created
systemic risk and systemic
events, including private risk man-
agement, market discipline, bank-
ing supervision, and market
surveillance.
To address weaknesses, the
European Commission proposed
on 23 September 2009 legislation
to improve existing micropruden-
tial supervision and to establish a
macroprudential supervisor to
oversee the entire European Union
financial system. While the
legislation creates new European
entities and focuses on European
priorities, it also reflects some of
the principles of reform agreed by
the G20 – as do reform proposals
in the United States. Although EU
and US reforms are designed to
address different financial struc-
tures, regulatory frameworks, and
economies, they have common
features (see Box 1 on page 4).
These include creation of a macro-
prudential supervisor; improve-
ment of microprudential supervi-
sion of financial institutions, espe-
cially systemically important
financial institutions (SIFIs)
3; reg-
ulation of over-the-counter deriva-
tives markets; and reforms of
rules-based capital adequacy and
liquidity requirements. 
EFFECTIVE PREVENTION REQUIRES
EARLY WARNINGS
The key to preventing European
crises is the establishment of a
process to identify, monitor, and
assess sources of financial risk
and vulnerabilities that threaten
financial stability, such as a hous-
ing market bubble. This is easier
said than done. The broad experi-
ence with prevention and predic-
tion of crises is not encouraging.
There are no failsafe early-warning
systems. Although improvements
are possible and this should be
pursued aggressively, it is unlikely
that a reliable framework will be
developed that can keep pace with
financial innovation. Reform leg-
islation should fully reflect this
scepticism and reality. 
The key to improving early-warn-
ing systems is the early identifica-
tion of sources of financial imbal-
ances before they become large
enough to pose a systemic risk or
create vulnerabilities (Table 2 pro-
vides a list of sources)
4. Prior to
the crisis, imbalances and vulner-
abilities arose and accumulated in
financial institutions, markets,
and infrastructures, and it shouldMORE THAN ONE STEP TO FINANCIAL STABILITY
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3. Microprudential
supervision focuses on
individual financial
institutions and other
important components
of the financial system,
such as payments sys-
tems, exchanges and
clearing houses. Its pri-
mary aim is to ensure
the soundness of indi-
vidual institutions.
Macroprudentialsuper-
vision focuses on the
financial system as a
whole. Its aim is to
assess, monitor, cali-
brate and mitigate the
adverse consequences
of system-wide prob-
lems that pose a threat
to financial-system
functioning and
stability, and ultimately
to economic activity
and stability. Systemic
riskis the concern that
financial (liquidity or
solvency) problems in
individual institutions
or in key financial mar-
kets could pose a risk
to the smooth function-
ing and stability of the
financial system as a
whole and ultimately
the broader economy.
4. See Schinasi (2006),
Chapters 4-6 for further
details about such a
framework. See
Haldane (2004) and
some later work for an
alternative approach.
Table 2: Sources of risk to financial stability
Endogenous
Institutions-based:
• Financial risks
- Credit
- Market
- Liquidity
-I n t e r e s t  r a t e
- Currency
• Operational risk
• Information technology weak-
nesses
• Legal/integrity risk
• Reputation risk
• Business strategy risk
• Concentration risk
• Capital adequacy risk
Market-based:
• Counterparty risk
• Asset-price misalignment
• Run on markets
- Credit
- Liquidity
• Contagion
Infrastructure-based :
• Clearance, payment and settle-
ment system risk
• Infrastructure fragilities
-L e g a l
- Regulatory
- Accounting
- Supervisory
• Collapse of confidence leading to
runs
• Domino effects
Exogenous
Macroeconomic disturbances:
• Economic-environment risk
• Policy imbalances
Event risk:
• Natural disasters
• Political events
• Large business failures
be expected that they will arise
again in different forms and ways.
But identification is not enough.
Risks and their implications must
be calibrated in terms of their
potential adverse impact on eco-
nomic stability. It is not well under-
stood how to do this. Basic re-
search will be required to develop
methodologies and analytical
techniques. 
One way of envisioning a process
for preventing and resolving prob-
lems is represented in Figure 1. It
is essential that the process be a
continuous one of information
gathering, technical analysis,
monitoring, assessment, and cali-
bration. Because the ultimate
objective is maintaining the
stability of the economy, the
process should encompass both
economic and financial analyses,
and take advantage of institution-
al knowledge about the financial
system as a whole.
The process should be compre-
hensive and analytical (as illus-
trated by the top bar in Figure 1),
and should entail information-
gathering about, and monitoring
of, the macroeconomy (and at
times microeconomic aspects as
well) and the various aspects of
the financial system through
supervisory, regulatory, and
surveillance functions. Each of the
financial-system monitoring com-
ponents should cover both macro-
prudential and microprudential
characteristics. The process must
be systematic and forward-looking
for possible sources of risk, and
must calibrate the likelihood of
risks and their adverse impact if
not mitigated. This will not be easy
to accomplish. 
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Figure 1: Framework for maintaining financial system stabilityARE EU AND US MACROPRUDENTIAL
REGULATORS CREATED EQUAL?
Although each macroprudential ‘reg-
ulator’ will be responsible for sys-
temic-risk assessment and recom-
mending changes to mitigate risks,
they will not be ‘created equal’.
Explaining why requires some per-
spective on how the US regulator is
being envisioned. Two changes are
under consideration in the US: a
broader oversight perimeter for the
Federal Reserve and a new multi-
agency Systemic Risk Council
chaired by the US Treasury
Secretary. Under current plans, the
members of the Council will likely
include existing supervisory and
regulatory bodies, each of them
possessing policy instruments to
bring about risk-mitigating
changes: the Federal Reserve
System, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the
Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, the Commodities and
Futures Trading Commission, the
US Comptroller of the Currency.  
These agencies have overlapping
responsibilities, competing inter-
ests, and are subject to various
private and public influences.
Conflicts will no doubt arise in
assessing risks and deciding nec-
essary actions. But all are federal
agencies. Once consensus is
reached, each has legal authority
to effect change in financial
institutions and markets.
The main decision-making body of
the European Systemic Risk Board
(ESRB), the General Board, will
have voting members who are also
top-level policymakers: the gov-
ernors of national central banks,
the president and vice-president
of the European Central Bank
(ECB), a member of the European
Commission, and the chairpersons
of the three European Supervisory
Authorities. In addition there will
be members of the Board without
voting rights, one high-level repre-
sentative per member state of the
competent national supervisory
authorities and the president of
the Economic and Financial
Committee. The ECB will be the
secretariat of the ESRB and pro-
vide analytical support to the
process of the identification and
assessment of systemic risks and
vulnerabilities. 
BOX 1: KEY ELEMENTS OF EU AND US PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
EU and US reform proposals have the same broad aims, but pursue signif-
icantly different approaches.
Elements of EU reform proposals
5:
• Macroprudential supervision, through the creation of the European
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) – comprised of EU central bank governors
and possibly chaired by the ECB President – with a mandate to assess
systemic risks, to issue financial-stability risk warnings, and to recom-
mend and monitor implementation of macro-prudential actions by
national supervisory authorities.
• Microprudential supervision, through the creation of the European
System of Financial Supervisors (ESFS), comprised of three new
authorities – the European Banking Authority, European Insurance
Authority, and European Securities Authority – to ensure consistency of
national supervision and strengthened oversight of cross-border enti-
ties through supervisory colleges and agreement on ‘a European single
rule book applicable to all financial institutions in the single market’.
• Market reform of over-the-counter derivatives – require standardisation
and trading on platforms/clearing houses to make them more robust
and transparent.
• Raise international standards, including regulation of alternative
investment managers; amendments to capital requirements for trading-
book exposures and highly complex re-securitisations
6; enhanced disclo-
sure of complex securitisation exposures; and bank remuneration policies. 
Elements of US proposed reforms
7:
• Macroprudential supervision and regulation, with the Federal Reserve
assuming responsibility for microprudential supervision and regulation
of all systemic firms, tighter prudential standards for large and inter-
connected firms, registration of hedge funds, and the creation of a
Financial Services Oversight Council chaired by the Treasury to identify
emerging macroprudential risks and coordinate agencies.
• Market reform, including enhanced transparency and strengthened
incentives for securitisers (‘skin in the game’), and better regulation of
credit-rating agencies and over-the-counter derivatives markets.
• Consumer and investor protection, with the creation of a Consumer
Financial Protection Agency, and stronger and more uniform rules.
• Crisis-management tools, namely for non-bank resolution and revised
emergency lending powers for the Federal Reserve (requiring written
approval from the Treasury Secretary).
• Raise international standards, including through stronger and better-coordi-
nated capital and liquidity standards and crisis-management arrangements.
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5. See European
Commission (2009a).
6. See European
Commission (2009b). 
7. See US Treasury
(2008). Also see
Schinasi (2009) and
IMF (2009) for more
details and analyses on
these proposals.
8. European
Commission  (2009)
also states, “The ESRB
should therefore have
access to all the infor-
mation necessary to
perform its duties while
preserving the confi-
dentiality of these data.
The ESRB will be able to
rely on the broad set of
data already collected
through the
Eurosystem by the ECB
on Monetary and
Financial Institutions...  
MORE THAN ONE STEP TO FINANCIAL STABILITYBut the similarities stop there. As
stated in European Commission
(2009), “The ESRB will not have
any binding powers to impose
measures on Member States or
national authorities. It has been
conceived as a ‘reputational’ body
with a high level composition that
should influence the actions of
policy makers and supervisors by
means of its moral authority.” It
will have the mandate to assess
systemic risks and access to the
information required to assess
Europe-wide risks and vulnerabili-
ties (including microprudential
information and
data)
8. But it will not
have legal authority to
force through change.
Instead, national
authorities are
responsible for taking
action. But they are
not legally obliged to
do so.  
The ESRB will have authority to
make policy recommendations.
When it identifies a risk or vulnera-
bility, it can make a formal recom-
mendation about what needs to be
done to reduce the risk and vulner-
ability and who should act. While a
member country may not agree
with an ESRB assessment and rec-
ommendation, it cannot simply
ignore the call for action. The mem-
ber state is required to express
why it disagrees with the ESRB’s
assessment and is not taking the
recommended action. This could
be an improvement over the status
quo but, as mentioned, the ESRB’s
recommendations are not binding.
It is possible that in some cases
this weakness could be overcome;
Article 99 of the treaty provides
the Council with the authority to
make similar recommendations on
the basis of an assessment of the
Economic and Finance Committee,
where the ECB is represented. An
improvement over the status quo
could come about through a
strengthening of the role of central
banks in the ESRB. It is not clear
that this will make a difference;
Article 99 was not called on to
encourage some member states to
take policy actions during the
crisis that were deemed to be nec-
essary.
Despite the absence of binding
policy instruments, it is possible
that the ‘moral author-
ity’ of the ESRB would
also help to improve
outcomes. Among the
voting members, the
ECB has an explicit
mandate to oversee
the smooth function-
ing of the Target pay-
ments system, and
has several years of experience in
assessing sources of risks and
vulnerabilities within the context
of its semi-annual publication, the
Financial Stability Review. In addi-
tion, other voting members from
national central
banks also having
supervisory authority
will be part of the
assessment process.
They have direct
access to micropru-
dential information
on systemically
important financial
institutions and
supervisory powers to affect
change. By virtue of being on the
Board, they will learn about the
macroprudential risks and vulner-
abilities and thereby be better
informed to supervise financial
institutions.
IF IT BECOMES NECESSARY, IS
EUROPE BETTER PREPARED THAN
THE US TO RESOLVE THE 
INSOLVENCY OF SEVERAL SIFIS?
9
Another systemic vulnerability
revealed by the global crisis is that
no country in the world has an
effective legal and enforceable
process for dealing with the insol-
vency of a SIFI in an orderly man-
ner. Consider the actions neces-
sary in the US to restore financial
stability and market functioning.
Several SIFIs faced insolvency and
there was no insolvency regime to
resolve them. US authorities had to
underwrite and provide bridge
loans for mergers, extend Federal
Reserve System loans, and recapi-
talise institutions with unprece-
dented amounts of taxpayer dol-
lars. Despite these actions, US
financial markets experienced
unprecedented stresses and
strains and systemic dysfunction.  
Europe too faced the insolvency of
financial institutions. But with the
exception of some systemically
important financial institutions in
the United Kingdom, which
required large sums
of taxpayers’ money,
most other European
institutions were
either smaller instit-
utions or had limited
cross-border expo-
sures and business
models. For example,
the resolution of
Fortis’s difficulties
involved only three countries. Thus
in most cases, European instit-
utions that were reaching the point
of insolvency proved not to be sys-
temically important enough to
threaten the stability of the entire
European financial system. Europe
‘The ESRB will
assess systemic
risks but will not
have legal authority
to force through
change.’
‘No European coun-
try has an effective
process for dealing
with the insolvency
of a SIFI in an
orderly  manner.’
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...Additionally to fulfill its
tasks and ensure the
necessary consistency
between the micro-
supervisors and the
ESRB, the ESRB, through
its secretariat, will also
be able to  request the
ESAs [European
Supervisory Authorities]
to provide information
in summary or collec-
tive form. Should this
information be not
available (or not made
available), the ESRB will
have the possibility to
request data directly
from national superviso-
ry authorities, national
central banks (NCBs) or
other authorities of
Member States. The reg-
ulation furthermore
creates a general obliga-
tion on the ESAs, the
NCBs and the Member
States to provide to the
ESRB all the information
needed for the fulfill-
ment of its tasks, thus
guaranteeing a wide
access to the data need-
ed for the macro-pru-
dential analysis.”
9. See Pisani-Ferry and
Sapir (2009) for an
evaluation of how
Europe has resolved its
crisis so far relative to
expectations.
MORE THAN ONE STEP TO FINANCIAL STABILITYdid not escape a systemic crisis,
but with the exception of the UK, it
did not entail the kind of wide-
spread insolvencies that occurred
across the Atlantic.
In the event, Europe was fortunate
not to have faced the challenges of
resolving an insolvent SIFI.
Nevertheless, Europe has some
40-45 large banks with significant
cross-border exposure across the
European landscape.
Urgent action is required in Europe.
Each member state has its own
resolution regime and a strong
incentive to design its resolution
strategies to satisfy national
objectives. Moreover, it is clear
from how Fortis was resolved –
national ring-fencing and solu-
tions – that Europe’s existing
architecture for coordinated reso-
lutions is ineffective and is not
designed to resolve cross-border
institutions. Note that the
resolution of Fortis involved only
three member states with consid-
erable experience of coordinating
policies. In light of the crisis and
this specific European experience,
it would be prudent for Europe to
establish as quickly as possible
legal and enforceable procedures
for resolving, in an orderly manner,
the insolvency of one or more
European SIFIs with significant
and widespread cross-border
exposures. No country has been
able to do this as yet because it is
a complicated legal and policy
issue. But discussions should
begin in earnest now
10. 
MEETING THE CHALLENGES POSED
BY OTHER UNADDRESSED WEAK-
NESSES REVEALED BY THE CRISIS
There are several other areas
where further thinking and
reforms are necessary. 
Ensure that central banks have
tools to co-manage monetary and
financial stability
Central banks by design are the
immediate providers of liquidity in
all of the major financial centres.
They are the only public
institutions with the ability to
intervene in markets, and in some
cases institutions, to provide liq-
uidity and thereby manage and
contain the adverse
consequences of the
onset of market turbu-
lence and system-
wide crises. All central
banks have the
mandate to maintain
monetary stability to
promote low inflation,
and therefore sustainable growth,
even though their specific targets
and monetary operations may dif-
fer considerably. One lesson of the
crisis is that monetary and
financial stability are inextricably
intertwined. Decision-makers
should make it a priority to ensure
that central-bank independence is
fully maintained in the pursuit of
monetary-policy objectives and
that they also have the necessary
tools and flexibility – that is, dis-
cretion – to help to maintain
financial stability in so far as it
threatens the maintenance of
monetary stability.
Consider global regulation and
surveillance of the global over-
the-counter derivatives markets
These markets are truly global and
systemic. Both the EU and US
proposals would require that many
of the over-the-counter derivative
transactions that are now traded
and risk-managed on a bilateral
basis be traded and settled within
multilateral central clearing hou-
ses
11. This would help to mitigate
some of the inherent systemic risk
by having the larger institutions
that trade these instruments do so
by pooling risks within a central
clearing house, in which losses
could be burden-shared to some
extent, and failed contracts could
be unwound in-house in a more
orderly manner. There are many
similarities between the EU and US
proposals, but there
is also fierce
competition between
the financial centres
in Europe and the
United States. It
would be unfortunate
if these competitive
tensions led to a ‘race
to the bottom’ in regulating these
systemically important markets.
Uncoordinated solutions will not
work. And reforms falling short of
global solutions could lead to the
persistence of regulatory arbi-
trage, complexity, opacity, and
systemically threatening counter-
party relationships. For these rea-
sons, leadership at the head-of-
state level may be required to
forge a consensus that a global
regulatory framework and plat-
form is necessary for the regula-
tion of these markets. 
Reconsider the inter-temporal
benefits and costs of too-big-to-
fail SIFIs
Some financial institutions were
considered to be too big to fail, and
the crisis has revealed that some
were too big to manage and too dif-
ficult to save without massive
injections of taxpayers’ money.
‘There are similari-
ties between the EU
and US proposals,
but there is also
fierce competition.’
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10. See Posen and
Veron (2009) for a pro-
posal for resolving
some of Europe’s bank-
ing losses.
11. See European
Commission  (2009)
and US Treasury
(2009) and references
therein for further
details on the broad
outlines of these
proposals. 
12. See de Jonghe
(2009), Laeven and
Levine (2006),
Lelyveld and Knott
(2008), and Schmidt
and Walter (2006).
Volcker (2008)
believes that  “...sys-
temically important
investment banking
institutions should be
regulated and super-
vised along at least the
basic lines appropriate
for commercial banks
that they closely
resemble in key
respects.”
MORE THAN ONE STEP TO FINANCIAL STABILITYOver the years, authorities in all of
the major financial centres have,
through explicit policies or inac-
tion, either promoted, encouraged,
or acquiesced in the emergence of
very large US global institutions
and very large and complex
European national champions.
This has often been permitted on
the basis of claims of economies
of scale and scope. However, the
extensive economics and finance
literature is inconclusive when
judging the actual economic effi-
ciency gains from economies of
scale and scope, contrary to SIFI
claims
12. Accordingly, leaders and
policymakers should be asking, in
the light of the inter-temporal
social costs now being experi-
enced, what exactly are the inter-
temporal efficiency gains to their
societies of combining mergers
and acquisitions, asset manage-
ment, securities origination and
underwriting, foreign-exchange
trading, commercial banking, and
other financial services all under
one roof? Can the claimed gains be
captured by more specialised
institutions that are less likely to
generate the social costs? It would
seem entirely appropriate for
these and other important related
subjects to receive as much ana-
lytical and policy attention as the
efforts now being expended in
both Europe and the US on formu-
lating reforms of the SIFI
surveillance, regulation, supervi-
sion, and governance framework,
regardless of whether they are
global or national champions
13.
PRIORITIES FOR ACTION
1. Because early-warning sys-
tems are likely to continue to be
unreliable in identifying sys-
temic risks and vulnerabilities
in an timely fashion, crises will
continue to occur. The first pri-
ority is to create early-
intervention and resolution
mechanisms for allowing for
the early and orderly closure of
SIFIs when warranted.No coun-
try now has such a resolution
mechanism. The first order of
business is for Europe to
address this systemic vulnera-
bility so that the insolvency of a
single or multiple large, com-
plex, cross-border institution
does not lead to another sys-
temic financial crisis any time
soon. A reasonable starting
point is Recommendation 13 of
the de Larosière Report. This
said that a transparent and
clear framework for managing
crises should be developed; all
relevant authorities in the EU
should be equipped with appro-
priate and equivalent crisis-
prevention and crisis-
intervention tools; and legal
obstacles standing in the way
of using these tools in a cross-
border context should be
removed, with adequate meas-
ures to be adopted at EU level.
Europe can also consider the
benefits of developing an early
intervention mechanism for
SIFIs along the lines of the
prompt-corrective-action mech-
anism successfully employed
by the US Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in
which small and medium-sized
insolvent institutions are
placed into an administrative
procedure once they reach a
specified capital adequacy
threshold. Within the mecha-
nism, the financial institution
continues to perform key func-
tions, including servicing
deposits, while the FDIC is
arranging a merger or selling off
the bank’s assets. 
2. In crafting EU financial-system
reforms,  decision-makers
should strive to ensure that
central banks retain the inde-
pendence required to conduct
successful monetary policies
and  obtain the necessary
authorisations, discretionary
instruments, and policy man-
dates required to ensure the
smooth functioning of
financial markets and the
stability of financial systems
more generally
14. The ECB is
likely to face serious challenges
in these respects. Similarly, it is
also likely to continue to face
political pressures that could
impinge on its independence
and operational abilities to deal
effectively with future systemic
crises.
3. Assessment is an important
element of crisis prevention.
But is of little value if those
assessments fall on deaf ears
or if actions required to mitigate
the risks and vulnerabilities are
not taken sufficiently and in a
timely manner. One way to
safeguard against inaction is to
provide specific authority to
effect change to the same
institutions that make the
assessments. In this regard,
Europe is lagging. The ESRB
might well emerge as an effec-
tive instrument for identifying
sources of vulnerabilities in the
European financial landscape,
but it will be to no avail if it does
not also have the authority and
policy instruments to impose
action to mitigate the risks
assessed and reduce the vul-
nerabilities identified.
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13. Bank of England
Governor Mervyn King
made this point in a
speech on 20 October
2009. He said that the
structure of banks
should be rethought,
and “the belief that
appropriate regulation
can ensure that specu-
lative activities do not
result in failures is a
delusion” (King, 2009).
14. Padoa-Schioppa
(2003) states, “The
role of central banks in
financial stability was
thus part of their genet-
ic code. It was – and, I
would be inclined to
say, still is – an inte-
gral part or an insepara-
ble component of the
central bank as a bank,
of its monopoly on ulti-
mate liquidity, of its
role as the bankers’
bank, and of commer-
cial banks as creators
of money themselves.”
See also Schinasi
(2003) for a discussion
of the natural role of
central banks in
financial stability. 
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4. Even though early-warning sys-
tems cannot be failsafe, Europe
nevertheless should strive
aggressively to improve the
effectiveness of official over-
sight of the financial system.
This will require extensive
reforms in the supervision of
financial institutions – not only
banking institutions – especial-
ly those that are large, complex
and systemically important.
Many of the institutions that
were at the core of the crisis fell
into this category, many of
them actually causing the crisis
through excessive risk-taking
and leveraging. Surveillance
and monitoring of institutions,
markets and infrastructures
also needs to be improved sig-
nificantly. Even though the cre-
ation of an effective early-warn-
ing system for systemic risk is a
never-ending challenge, authori-
ties should nevertheless strive
to build the best systems possi-
ble – grounded in reliable infor-
mation and data, and mandated
to develop the best analytical
capability possible – for assess-
ing sources of risk and vulnera-
bilities. This will require signifi-
cant resources, but it is a worth-
while investment to minimise
the cost of crisis resolution.
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